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THE EFFECTS OF ENERGY PRICES ON AGRICULTURAL
GROUNDWATER EXTRACTION FROMTHE HIGH PLAINS
AQUIFER
LISA PFEIFFER and C.-Y. CYNTHIA LIN
We examine the effects of energy prices on groundwater extraction using an econometric model of a
farmer’s irrigation water pumping decision that accounts for both the intensive and extensive margins.
Our results show that energy prices have an effect on both types of margins. Increasing energy prices
would affect crop selection decisions, crop acreage allocation decisions, and farmers’ demand for water.
Our estimated total marginal effect, which sums the effects on the intensive and extensive margins,
suggests that a $1 per million btu increase in the energy price would decrease water extraction by an
individual farmer by 5.89 acre-feet per year, a decrease of 3.6 percent of the average annual extraction
rate. Our estimated elasticity of water extraction with respect to energy price is −0.26.
Key words: Energy, groundwater extraction.
JEL codes: Q15, Q40.
Many of the world’s most productive agricul-
tural basins depend on groundwater. The food
that consumers eat, the farmers who produce
that food, and the local economies support-
ing that production are all affected by the
availability of groundwater. Worldwide, about
70% of water extracted or diverted for con-
sumptive use goes to agriculture, but in many
groundwater basins, this proportion can be as
high as 95–99%. In many agricultural regions
throughout the world, energy is an important
input used to extract groundwater for irriga-
tion (Schoengold and Zilberman 2007; Dumler
et al. 2009). Rising energy prices are there-
fore a potential concern for agriculture, as they
may affect the groundwater extraction and
crop choice decisions of farmers that require
energy to pump groundwater. In this article we
examine the effects that energy prices have on
groundwater extraction using an econometric
model of a farmer’s irrigation water pumping
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decision that accounts for both the intensive
and extensive margins.
Our research focuses on the groundwater
used for agriculture in the High Plains (Ogal-
lala) Aquifer system of the central United
States. There, 99% of the water extracted is
used for crop production, while the remain-
ing 1% is used for livestock, domestic, and
industrial purposes. The economy of the region
is based almost entirely on irrigated agricul-
ture. The alfafa, corn, sorghum, soybeans, and
wheat grown there are used for local livestock
production or exported from the region. The
small local communities support the agricul-
tural industry with farm implement dealers,
schools, restaurants, and other services. The
state governments are also greatly concerned
with supporting their agricultural industry.
Energy is an important input required to
extract groundwater for irrigation in the High
Plains Aquifer. Dumler et al. (2009) estimate
that the energy cost of extracting irrigation
water represents approximately 10% of the
costs for growing corn in western Kansas,which
is a slightly greater share of costs than land
rent. In this article we examine whether energy
prices impact groundwater extraction.
For the empirical analysis, we use a unique
data set that combines well-level groundwa-
ter extraction data with physical, hydrological,
and economic data. Our econometric model of
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a farmer’s irrigation water pumping decision
has two components: the intensive margin and
the extensive margin. For the extensive mar-
gin, we estimate the farmer’s choice of how
many acres to allocate to each crop using a
simultaneous equations selection model. For
the intensive margin, we estimate the farmer’s
water demand conditional on his crop acreage
allocation decisions. In addition to energy
prices, we also control for other factors that
may affect groundwater extraction, including
depth to groundwater, precipitation, irrigation
technology, saturated thickness, recharge, and
crop prices.
Our results show that energy prices have
an effect on both the intensive and exten-
sive margins. Increasing energy prices would
affect crop selection decisions, crop acreage
allocation decisions, and the demand for water
by farmers. The total marginal effect, which
sums the effects on the intensive and exten-
sive margins, estimates that a $1 per million
btu increase in the energy price would decrease
water extraction by an individual farmer by
5.89 acre-feet per year. Our estimated elastic-
ity of water extraction with respect to energy
price is −0.26.
Our article builds upon the work of
Zilberman et al. (2008), who develop theo-
retical models to analyze the effects of ris-
ing energy prices on the economics of water
in agriculture, and who find that the higher
cost of energy will substantially increase the
cost of groundwater. Our empirical analysis
also builds upon the work of Zhu, Ringler,
and Cai (2013), who simulate the effects of
energy prices on groundwater extraction in
India, China, the United States, and Vietnam.
We build upon these previous theory and sim-
ulation papers by empirically analyzing the
effects that energy prices have on groundwater
extraction.
Some of the existing empirical work on
the effects of energy prices on groundwater
extraction has taken place in a developing
country context. For example, Badiani and Jes-
soe (2013) empirically analyze the impact of
electricity subsidies on groundwater extraction
and agricultural production in India. Other
studies have used interviews or survey data
to analyze the relationship between energy
and groundwater extraction in India and/or
Mexico (Birner et al. 2007; Fan, Gulati, and
Sukhadeo 2008; Kumar 2005; Scott and Shah
2004).
In the U.S. context, Caswell and Zilberman
(1986), as well as Ogg and Gollehon (1989),
both use pumping costs as proxies for water
prices in California and the western United
States, respectively. While these papers do
not specifically focus on energy, they implic-
itly acknowledge the role of energy costs in
on-farm pumping as a driver of water use deci-
sions in the United States. Similarly, in their
estimates of crop choice, supply, land alloca-
tion, and water demand, Moore, Gollehon, and
Carey (1994) use as their water price an engi-
neering formula that translates groundwater
pumping lift into marginal cost in dollars per
acre-foot.
In a related paper, estimate irrigation water
demand in Kansas using an estimate of extrac-
tion cost as their proxy for water price. We
build on these authors’ work in two ways.
First, while the focus of Hendricks and Peter-
son (2012) is on the effects of water price,
which they compute using a pre-specified func-
tion of the natural gas price and the depth
to groundwater, our focus is on the effects of
energy price. Thus, while Hendricks and Peter-
son (2012) focus on estimating the own-price
elasticity of irrigation water demand to cal-
culate the cost of reducing irrigation water
use through water pricing, irrigation cessation,
and intensity-reduction programs, our article
focuses on the effects of energy prices on water
demand and crop choices in order to examine
the effects of rising energy prices.
The second way in which we build upon
Hendricks and Peterson (2012) is that our
econometric model not only controls for crop
acreage allocation decisions in the estimation
of water demand on the intensive margin,but it
also explicitly models the crop choice and crop
acreage allocation decisions in our estimation
of the extensive margin. Unlike Hendricks and
Peterson (2012),our model enables us to exam-
ine how changes in energy prices affect not only
water demand conditional on crop choice, but
also crop choice and crop acreage allocation
decisions.
The High Plains Aquifer in Kansas
Exploitation of the High Plains Aquifer sys-
tem began in the late 1800s but was greatly
intensified after the “Dust Bowl” decade of the
1930s (Miller and Appel 1997). Aided by the
development of high capacity pumps and cen-
ter pivot systems, irrigated acreage increased
from 1 million acres in 1960 to 3.1 million
acres in 2005, and accounts for 99% of all
groundwater withdrawals (Kenny and Hansen
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2004). Irrigation converted the region from the
“Great American Desert” into the “Breadbas-
ket of the World” (Muilenburg et al. 1975).
The High Plains Aquifer underlies approx-
imately 174,000 square miles, and eight states
overlie its boundary; it is the principle source
of groundwater in the Great Plains region of
the United States. Also known as the Ogallala
Aquifer, the High Plains Aquifer system is now
known to include several other aquifer forma-
tions. The portion of the aquifer that underlies
western Kansas, however, pertains mainly to
the Ogallala, and this is why the name persists
(Miller and Appel 1997).
The High Plains aquifer is underlain by rock
of very low permeability that creates the base
of the aquifer. The distance from this bedrock
to the water table is a measure of the total water
available and is known as the saturated thick-
ness. Figure 1 shows that the saturated thick-
ness of the High Plains aquifer in Kansas ranges
from nearly zero to over 300 feet (Buddemeier
2000).
The depth to water is the difference between
the altitude of the land surface and the altitude
of the water table. In areas where surface and
groundwater are hydrologically connected, the
water table can be very near to the surface.
In other areas, the water table is much deeper;
the depth to water is over 400 feet below the
surface in a portion of southwestern Kansas
(Miller and Appel 1997). The depth to ground-
water is shown in figure 2.
Water recharge to the Kansas portion of the
High Plains aquifer is very small, and is primar-
ily completed by percolation of precipitation
and return flow from water applied as irriga-
tion. The rates of recharge vary between 0.05
and 6 inches per year, with the greatest rates
of recharge occurring where the land surface is
covered by sand or other permeable material
(Buddemeier 2000).
Groundwater users in Kansas extract water
under the doctrine of prior appropriation,
meaning that they are allotted a maximum
amount to extract each year. This annual
amount was determined when the user origi-
nally applied for the permit and is the same
fixed amount each year (Pfeiffer and Lin 2012).
Appropriation contracts are stated in terms of a
maximum acre-feet of extraction per year with
a“use it or lose it”clause. Until recently (2012),
farmers must use their allocation each year and
are unable to bank any unused portions of the
water allocation in a particular year for use in
future years. However, since the groundwater
Saturated Thickness
0 - 50 ft
51 - 100 ft
101 - 200 ft
201 - 300 ft
over 300 ft
Figure 1. Predevelopment saturated thickness of the Kansas portion of theHigh PlainsAquifer
Source: Kansas Geological Survey.
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Depth to Water (ft)
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Over 250
Figure 2. Average 2004-2006 depth to groundwater in the Kansas portion of the High Plains
Aquifer
Source: Kansas Geological Survey.
is in part a nonrenewable resource, and since
the availability of water is stochastic owing to
variable weather and rainfall and since demand
for water is greater when it is less available,
farmers could operate in a more dynamically
efficient manner if the appropriator could use
less water in some years and more in others
(Lin and Pfeiffer, forthcoming). Nevertheless,
Pfeiffer and Lin (2013) find that despite the
incentives given to groundwater users to pump
their maximum allowable amount in each year
by the prior appropriation doctrine, farmers
extract water consistent with a dynamic model
of resource extraction.
The main crops grown in western Kansas
are alfalfa, corn, sorghum, soybean, and wheat
(High Plains Regional Climate Center 2014).
Corn production accounts for more than 50%
of all irrigated land (Buddemeier 2000), with
soil types and access to high volumes of irri-
gation water determining the suitability of a
particular piece of land to various crops.
Evapotranspiration is the loss of water to
the atmosphere by the combined processes of
evaporation (from soil and plant surfaces) and
transpiration (from plant tissues). This pro-
cess is thus an indicator of how much water
crops require for healthy growth and produc-
tivity. Many factors affect evapotranspiration:
weather parameters such as solar radiation,
air temperature, relative humidity, and wind
speed; soil factors such as soil texture, struc-
ture, density, and chemistry; and plant factors
such as plant type, root depth and foliar den-
sity, height, and stage of growth. Since there
are so many factors that affect evapotran-
spiration, it is extremely difficult to formu-
late an equation that can produce estimates
of evapotranspiration under different sets of
conditions. Therefore, the idea of reference
crop evapotranspiration was developed by
researchers; this refers to the evapotranspira-
tion rate of a reference crop expressed in inches
or millimeters (CIMIS 2009).
Reference crops are alfalfa surfaces, whose
biophysical characteristics have been studied
extensively. The logic behind the reference
evapotranspiration idea is to establish weather
stations on standardized reference surfaces for
which most of the biophysical properties used
in evapotranspiration equations are known.
Using these known parameters and measured
weather parameters, evapotranspiration from
such surfaces is estimated. Then a crop fac-
tor, commonly known as crop coefficient, is
used to calculate the actual evapotranspiration
for a specific crop in the same microclimate
as the weather station site (CIMIS 2009). The
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Table 1. Evapotranspiration Crop
Coefficients
Crop Crop Coefficient
Alfafa 0.10 – 1.00
Corn 0.10 – 1.10
Sorghum 0.10 – 1.10
Soybeans 0.10 – 1.10
Wheat 0.10 – 1.10
Source: High Plains Regional Climate Center, 2014.
crop coefficient for a particular crop varies
depending on the stage of growth for the
crop.
Table 1 presents the range of the crop coef-
ficients for the High Plains for each of the
main crops grown in western Kansas as cal-
culated by the High Plains Regional Climate
Center (2014). As table 1 illustrates, the range
of the crop coefficients overlap with each other
so that the relative ranking of the crops by
water intensiveness may vary depending on
the stage of growth for each crop. There is
therefore no clear ranking of these crops by
water intensiveness, and the upper bound crop
coefficient for alfafa is lower than that for the
other crops.
The quality of water in the High Plains
aquifer is affected by many factors. These fac-
tors include the chemical composition and
solubility of aquifer materials, the increase in
dissolved solids concentrations in groundwater
in areas where the water discharges by evap-
otranspiration, and the chemical composition
of water that recharges the aquifer. The dis-
solved solids concentration in groundwater is
a general indicator of the chemical quality of
the water. In most of Kansas, dissolved solids
concentrations in water from the High Plains
aquifer are less than 500 milligrams per liter,
the limit of dissolved solids recommended by
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for
drinking water, but locally can exceed 1,000
milligrams per liter (Miller and Appel 1997).
Excessive concentrations of sodium in water
adversely affect plant growth and soil proper-
ties, and constitute salinity and sodium hazards
that may limit irrigation development. Sodium
that has been concentrated in the soil by evap-
otranspiration and ion exchange decreases soil
tillability and permeability; areas of high or
very high sodium hazard occur in parts of
Kansas, while sodium concentrations in water
from the High Plains aquifer are less than 25
milligrams per liter in most of northern Kansas.
Concentrations are greatest in southwestern
Kansas where evapotranspiration rates are
high and in south-central Kansas, where the
High Plains aquifer overlies Permian bedrock
that contains saline water derived from the par-
tial dissolution of salt beds (Miller and Appel
1997).
Overall, it does not seem that significant
irrigation-related increases in salinity exist in
western Kansas, except in the Valley-Fill Allu-
vium soils along river beds and in the Permian
rock bed area. The Valley-Fill Alluvium unit
is susceptible to increasing salinity because
irrigation water is recycled along alluvial val-
leys in a downstream direction as water is
pumped from the aquifer or diverted from
the river, applied to fields, and then returned
to the aquifer as irrigation drainage. During
each irrigation/return flow cycle, salinity is
increased as water is transpired by crops and
as return-flow water dissolves additional min-
erals from the soil (Litke 2001). Nitrate and
pesticide contamination appears to be a prob-
lem in some areas and is related to land use
(Steichen et al. 1998; Helgesen, Stullken, and
Rutledge 1994).
Data
We use a particularly rich data set for our
empirical analysis. Kansas has required the
reporting of groundwater pumping by water
rights holders since the 1940s, although only
data from 1996 to the present are considered
to be complete and reliable. The data are avail-
able from the Water Information Management
and Analysis System (WIMAS). Spatially ref-
erenced pumping data at the source (well or
pump) level is included, and each data point
identifies the farmer, field, irrigation technol-
ogy, amount pumped, and crops grown.
The crop price data we use are a combination
of spring futures contracts for September deliv-
ery for commodities with futures contracts
and average price received for crops without
futures contracts. Futures prices are taken from
the Commodity Research Board, and price
received is from the United States Department
of Agriculture (USDA) Economic Research
Service.
Of the acres irrigated from groundwater
wells in Kansas, about 50% are supplied by
pumps powered with natural gas, 25% are sup-
plied by pumps powered with diesel fuel, and
22% are supplied by pumps powered with elec-
tricity (FRIS 2004); our water data does not
indicate the type of energy used for irrigation.
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Table 2. Summary Statistics
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Individual-year level variables
Irrigation water pumped (af) 154,619 164.37 124.12 0.00 1,491.48
Acres planted to alfafa 154,619 11.92 39.22 0.00 640.00
Acres planted to corn 154,619 59.90 74.32 0.00 640.00
Acres planted to sorghum 154,619 5.12 24.23 0.00 620.00
Acres planted to soybeans 154,619 11.09 33.82 0.00 542.00
Acres planted to wheat 154,619 16.49 43.18 0.00 584.00
Irrigation water used by neighbors (1 mile radius, af) 154,619 437.72 428.38 0.00 4,586.97
Depth to groundwater (ft) 154,619 125.27 74.48 4.77 355.87
Individual level variables
Recharge (in) 17,960 1.25 1.13 0.30 6.00
Average precipitation (in) 17,960 21.64 3.77 16.00 32.90
Average evapotranspiration (in) 17,960 55.19 1.02 48.89 58.75
Slope (% of distance) 17,960 1.07 0.88 0.01 8.68
Irrigated Capability Class=1 (dummy) 17,960 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00
Saturated Thickness of the aquifer (ft) 17,960 126.27 104.86 0.00 553.64
Quantity authorized for extraction (af) 17,960 283.81 206.90 0.00 2,400.00
Field size (ac) 17,960 183.97 102.76 60.59 640.00
Year-level variables
Corn price futures ($/bu) 10 2.56 0.32 2.24 3.20
Sorghum price futures ($/bu) 10 6.84 1.84 5.17 11.12
Soy price futures ($/bu) 10 5.95 1.17 4.52 7.73
Wheat price futures ($/bu) 10 3.57 0.32 3.18 4.19
Alfalfa price ($/ton) 10 81.23 9.51 70.58 95.92
10 year forecast of the real acreage-weighted price of
commodities ($/bu)
10 2.70 0.31 2.29 3.14
Energy price, base case ($/million btu) 10 7.33 2.54 5.15 13.39
Energy price, alternative A ($/million btu) 10 11.21 1.35 10.12 14.50
Energy price, alternative B ($/million btu) 10 4.99 2.35 3.00 10.56
Notes: In the base case specification, we use the natural gas price as the energy price for farmers in counties with natural gas production, and the diesel price as
the energy price for all other farmers. In specification A, we use the natural gas price as the energy price for farmers in counties with natural gas production,
and the electricity price as the energy price for all other farmers. In specification B, we use the natural gas price as the energy price for all farmers.
In our base case specification, we use the nat-
ural gas price as the energy price for farmers
in counties with natural gas production, which
represents 55.2% of the farmers, and the diesel
price as the energy price for all other farmers.
For robustness, we also run our model using
two alternative specifications for the energy
price. In specification A, we use the natural gas
price as the energy price for farmers in counties
with natural gas production and the electricity
price as the energy price for all other farmers.
In specification B, we use the natural gas price
as the energy price for all farmers. County-level
natural gas production data used to determine
which counties had natural gas production are
taken from the Kansas Geological Survey. Nat-
ural gas prices, diesel prices and electricity
prices come from the U.S. Energy Information
Administration and are all converted to units
of dollars per million btu.
Soil characteristics come from the Web Soil
Survey of the USDA Natural Resources Con-
servation Service. The irrigated capability class
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the soil is
classified as the best soil for irrigated agricul-
ture with few characteristics that would limit
its use, and zero otherwise. Precipitation data
come from the PRISM group.
Summary statistics for the variables used
in the analysis are presented in table 2. The
average quantity of irrigation water pumped
per individual farmer per year is 164.37 acre-
feet. In a one-mile radius, an average of 437.72
acre-feet of water are pumped by neighboring
farmers. The average depth from the surface
of the ground to groundwater is 125.27 feet.
Potential recharge to the Kansas portion of
the High Plains Aquifer is low; the average
potential recharge is 1.25 inches annually.
Each farmer received an average of 21.64
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inches of precipitation per year. The average
slope of the ground surface, as a percentage of
distance, is 1.07%. About 45% of the plots are
in irrigated capability class 1. Field size is an
average of 183.97 acres. Energy prices for our
base case specification are, on average, $7.33
per million btu.
Empirical Model
We examine the effects of energy prices on
groundwater extraction using an econometric
model of a farmer’s irrigation water pumping
decision that accounts for both the intensive
and extensive margins. The extensive margin
of the groundwater extraction decision is the
crop choice and crop acreage allocation deci-
sion, and involves a simultaneous equation
model in which the dependent variables (the
number of acres planted to each crop) are cen-
sored by sample selection. A positive number
of acres planted to crop c is observed only
when the farmer chooses to plant crop c. Thus,
the sample of crop c-planters is non-random,
and drawn from a wider population of farm-
ers. Both choices (the decision to plant and the
number of acres planted to crop c) must be
modeled to avoid sample selection bias. Opti-
mal land allocation nict∗ to each crop c by each
farmer i in each time period t can be estimated
as:
qict = f (et , pct , xit , zit−1, dit),
c= alfalfa, corn, sorghum,
soybeans, wheat(1)
nict∗ = g(et , pct , xit , dit , IMRc),
c= soybeans, wheat, sorghum,
soybeans, wheat(2)
where qict represents the decision to plant crop
c; nict∗ is the number of acres planted to each
crop c and is observed only when qict > 0; et
are energy prices;pct are crop price futures (for
delivery at harvest); xit is a vector of plot-level
variables including field size, irrigation tech-
nology, average precipitation, average evapo-
transpiration, slope, soil quality, and quantity
of water authorized for extraction; and zit−1
is a vector of lagged dummy variables indi-
cating if various crops were planted in the
previous season to account for crop rotation
patterns. Following Pfeiffer and Lin (2013),
dit are variables that would impact a farmer’s
decision if he optimized dynamically, includ-
ing recharge, saturated thickness, the amount
pumped in the previous period by neighbors,
and a 10-year forecast of future commodities
prices.
The system of equations corresponding to
(1) and (2) can be estimated using Lee’s
generalization of Amemiya’s two-step estima-
tor to a simultaneous equation model (Lee
1990); Lee (1990) also shows that this proce-
dure leads to estimates that are asymptotically
more efficient than the Heckman selection
model (Heckman 1978). In the first step, probit
regressions corresponding to the crop selec-
tion equations (1) are estimated to measure
the effect of the explanatory variables on the
decision to grow each crop c. Inverse-Mills
ratios (IMRc) are calculated for each crop. In
the second step, the inverse-Mills ratios are
included as explanatory variables in the crop
acreage allocation equations corresponding to
equation (2). The ratios are estimated as a
simultaneous system of equations to exploit the
information contained in the cross-equation
correlations.1
The coefficients of interest are the coeffi-
cients on energy prices et in the selectivity-
corrected cropland allocation models in
equation (2). We include energy prices both
by themselves and interacted with depth to
groundwater, since we expect that the energy
costs of pumping may increase with the dis-
tance the water needs to be pumped.
Parameters in selection models are esti-
mated with more precision if some regressors
in the selection equation can be excluded from
the outcome equation (Wooldridge 2002). To
estimate the coefficients on energy price and on
energy price interacted with depth to ground-
water in the crop acreage equations (2), we
exclude the lagged crop choice variables zit−1
from the crop acreage equations (2), but not
from the crop choice equations (1). Lagged
crop choices are likely to affect a farmer’s crop
choice decisions but arguably do not affect
the crop acreage decision. Whether or not a
farmer planted a particular crop during the pre-
vious year may affect which crops he plants this
year due to crop rotation patterns, but condi-
tional on making a particular crop choice in the
1 Correlation across the errors in different equations can pro-
vide links that can be exploited in a system estimation to improve
estimator efficiency (Ruud 2000; Wooldridge 2002). Even if the
system estimators are asymptotically equivalent to the equation-
by-equation estimators, system estimation enables one to estimate
the covariances between the estimators from different equations
(Wooldridge 2002).
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Table 3. Probit Results for Crop Selection
Dependent variable is probability of planting:
Alfalfa Corn Sorghum Soybeans Wheat
Energy price ($/million btu) −0.023∗∗∗ 0.001 0.023∗∗∗ −0.028∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Energy price ($/million btu)∗
Depth to groundwater (ft)
−0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0001∗∗ −0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0002∗∗∗ −0.0001∗∗∗
(0.00003) (0.00002) (0.00003) (0.00002) (0.00002)
Depth to groundwater (ft) −0.0007∗∗ 0.0003∗∗ 0.0005∗ −0.0017∗∗∗ 0.0004∗
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Alfalfa price ($/ton yearly aver-
age)
0.003∗∗ −0.001∗ 0.002∗∗ −0.001 −0.002∗
(0.001) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.001) (0.0006)
Corn price ($/bu futures) 0.269∗ 0.160∗ −0.807∗∗∗ 0.515∗∗∗ −0.462∗∗∗
(0.119) (0.070) (0.117) (0.093) (0.086)
Sorghum price ($/bu spring aver-
age)
−0.062∗∗∗ −0.090∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗ −0.054∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.009) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011)
Soybeans price ($/bu futures) −0.052∗ 0.043∗∗ 0.016 −0.003 0.029
(0.023) (0.013) (0.022) (0.018) (0.016)
Kansas wheat price ($/bu futures) 0.329∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗ −0.105∗∗ −0.173∗∗∗ −0.071∗
(0.040) (0.023) (0.038) (0.029) (0.028)
Recharge (in) 0.046∗∗∗ −0.109∗∗∗ −0.009 0.012 −0.032∗∗
(0.014) (0.007) (0.011) (0.007) (0.010)
Average yearly precipitation,
1971–2001 (in)
−0.043∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.009∗ 0.134∗∗∗ −0.054∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Average evapotranspiration (in) 0.044∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ −0.013 0.182∗∗∗ −0.058∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.006) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008)
Slope (% of distance) 0.082∗∗∗ 0.004 0.030∗∗∗ −0.058∗∗∗ −0.006
(0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
Irrigated Capability Class = 1 −0.269∗∗∗ 0.023∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.026∗ 0.056∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.009) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011)
Saturated thickness of the aquifer
(ft)
−0.269∗∗∗ 0.023∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.026∗ 0.056∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.009) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011)
Quantity authorized for extraction
(af)
−0.00008 0.00005∗ 0.00005 −0.00004 0.00002
(0.00004) (0.00002) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00002)
Field size (ac) −0.0003∗∗∗ −0.0002∗∗∗ 0.0007∗∗∗ −0.0002∗ 0.0011∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000)
Center pivot irrigation system
(compared to flood)
0.079∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗ −0.258∗∗∗ −0.023 0.030∗
(0.021) (0.012) (0.018) (0.016) (0.015)
Center pivot irrigation system
with dropped nozzles (compared
to flood)
0.076∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗ −0.324∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.008
(0.018) (0.010) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012)
10-year forecast of the real
acreage-weighted price of
commodities ($/bu)
−0.383∗∗∗ 0.401∗∗∗ 0.091 −0.396∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.030) (0.050) (0.040) (0.037)
Quantity of water used by neigh-
bors in 1 mile radius in t-1 (af)
0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0001∗∗∗ −0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0001∗∗∗ −0.0001∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Planted alfafa in t-1 (dummy) 2.521∗∗∗ −0.494∗∗∗ −0.066∗∗ −0.267∗∗∗ −0.153∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.014) (0.022) (0.022) (0.017)
Planted corn in t-1 (dummy) −0.336∗∗∗ 1.400∗∗∗ −0.091∗∗∗ 0.630∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.008) (0.013) (0.011) (0.010)
Planted sorghum in t-1 (dummy) −0.170∗∗∗ 0.022 1.552∗∗∗ 0.447∗∗∗ 0.301∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.016)
Planted soybeans in t-1 (dummy) −0.251∗∗∗ 0.787∗∗∗ 0.280∗∗∗ 0.905∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.012) (0.018) (0.013) (0.015)
Planted wheat in t-1 (dummy) 0.050∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.414∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 1.636∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.010)
Left land fallow or planted with a
non-irrigated plot in t-1 (dummy)
−0.070∗∗ −0.261∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗ −0.080∗∗∗ 0.039∗
(0.024) (0.015) (0.022) (0.024) (0.018)
continued.
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Table 3. continued
Dependent variable is probability of planting:
Alfalfa Corn Sorghum Soybeans Wheat
Constant −3.279∗∗∗ −6.465∗∗∗ −0.804 −13.72∗∗∗ 2.827∗∗∗
(0.657) (0.365) (0.606) (0.465) (0.463)
Observations 154,619 154,619 154,619 154,619 154,619
Notes: Marginal effects are reported. Standard errors appear in parentheses. For the energy price, we use the natural gas price as the energy price for farmers
in counties with natural gas production and the diesel price as the energy price for all other farmers. Significance is denoted as follows: ∗ = 5% level, ∗∗ = 1%
level, and ∗∗∗ = 0.1% level.
present year, the previous year’s crop choice is
unlikely to affect the acreage allocated to each
crop for the present year.2
The intensive margin of the groundwater
extraction decision is the water demand condi-
tional on crop choice, which is estimated using
ordinary least squares:
(3) wit = h(et , nict∗, xit , dit)
where wit is the amount of water extracted
by farmer i in year t. In the water demand
equation (3), we include both energy price and
energy price squared, as well as energy price
interacted with depth to groundwater. We also
include number of acres planted to each crop
and the number of acres planted to each crop
squared.
The total marginal effect of energy prices is
the sum of the effect along the intensive mar-
gin from the water demand equation (3) and
the effects along the extensive margin from
the selectivity-corrected cropland allocation
models (Moore, Gollehon, and Carey 1994) in
equation (2):3
(4)
dw
de
= ∂w
∂e
+
∑
c
∂w
∂nc∗
∂nc∗
∂e
.
2 Even though excluding last year’s crop choice from the acreage
allocation regressions improves the efficiency of our estimators, this
exclusion restriction is not necessary for identification (Wooldridge
2002). Our results on the effects of energy price were robust regard-
ing whether the lagged crop choice variables are excluded from
the crop acreage allocation regressions and also robust regarding
whether lagged crop acreage is added to both the crop choice and
the crop acreage allocation regressions.
3 Another possible decision is to not irrigate some acres. Unfor-
tunately, the data does not permit us to analyze this decision. We
only observe if the entire field was not irrigated, but we do not
observe whether part of the field was not irrigated, nor do we
observe the number of acres that were not irrigated. In the regres-
sions of water demand conditional on crop choice, we control for
whether the entire field was not irrigated. In the probit regres-
sions of crop choice, we control for whether the entire field was not
irrigated in the previous year.
Results
Tables 3 and 4 show the estimation results
for equations (1) and (2), respectively, using
our base case specification for energy price.
When considering only the significant coeffi-
cients on energy price and on the interaction
between energy price and depth to groundwa-
ter in table 4, and when evaluated at the mean
depth to groundwater, our results show that
energy prices cause a significant decrease in
the acreage allocated to corn, sorghum, soy-
beans, and wheat, and a significant increase in
the acreage allocated to alfafa. An increase in
the energy price of $1 per million btu decreases
the number of acres allocated to corn,sorghum,
soybeans,and wheat by 1.30,0.83,2.21,and 0.80
acres per farmer, respectively. These acreage
values are between 0.43% and 1.20% of the
average field size. An increase in the energy
price of $1 per million btu increases the num-
ber of acres allocated to alfafa by 0.03 acres per
farmer,which is 0.02% of the average field size.
The results of estimating equation (3), water
use along the intensive margin, conditional
on crop choice, for the base case specifica-
tion of energy price, are presented in table 5.
As expected, the coefficient on the interaction
between energy price and depth to groundwa-
ter is negative. As the distance the water needs
to be pumped increases, the energy costs of
pumping increases. Thus, increases in energy
prices cause a greater decrease in water use
conditional on crop choice as the depth to
groundwater increases.
Table 6 summarizes the calculations used to
derive the total intensive margin, which are
based on the coefficients on the energy price,
on energy price squared,and on the interaction
between energy price and depth to groundwa-
ter in the water use regression in table 5, all
of which are significant. Evaluated at mean
energy price and mean depth to groundwa-
ter, an increase in energy prices by $1 per
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Table 4. Selectivity-corrected Results for Crop Acreage Allocation (Extensive Margin)
Dependent variable is number of acres allocated to:
Alfalfa Corn Sorghum Soybeans Wheat
Energy price ($/million btu) −0.969∗∗∗ −2.430∗∗∗ −0.831∗∗ −2.213∗∗∗ −0.797∗∗∗
(0.251) (0.126) (0.305) (0.174) (0.216)
Energy price ($/million btu) * Depth
to groundwater (ft)
0.008∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ −0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Depth to groundwater (ft) −0.069∗∗∗ −0.033∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.019 0.024∗
(0.014) (0.007) (0.016) (0.012) (0.009)
Alfalfa price ($/ton yearly average) 0.109∗ 0.015 −0.016 −0.043 0.063
(0.051) (0.027) (0.068) (0.043) (0.041)
Corn price ($/bu futures) −4.808 8.840∗∗ −17.96 18.82∗∗∗ −2.484
(6.681) (3.338) (9.286) (5.702) (5.287)
Sorghum price ($/bu spring average) 1.527 −3.845∗∗∗ 3.627∗∗ −4.949∗∗∗ −0.347
(0.864) (0.473) (1.163) (0.727) (0.704)
Soybeans price ($/bu futures) −1.719 0.370 −0.723 0.631 0.693
(1.269) (0.653) (1.727) (1.096) (1.004)
Kansas wheat price ($/bu futures) −0.860 3.290∗∗ 5.072 −2.189 0.105
(2.193) (1.134) (3.036) (1.777) (1.745)
Recharge (in) −1.662 −4.023∗∗∗ −4.197∗∗∗ −0.660 −1.955∗∗
(1.003) (0.367) (0.823) (0.389) (0.749)
Average yearly precipitation, 1971–
2000 (in)
−0.537 3.207∗∗∗ 2.051∗∗∗ 3.245∗∗∗ 0.923∗∗∗
(0.344) (0.141) (0.343) (0.225) (0.226)
Average evapotranspiration (in) −6.177∗∗∗ 2.577∗∗∗ 3.337∗∗∗ 0.127 2.838∗∗∗
(0.704) (0.323) (0.902) (0.517) (0.561)
Slope (% of distance) 0.679 0.477 −0.829 −1.939∗∗∗ 1.215∗∗
(0.388) (0.247) (0.583) (0.412) (0.374)
Irrigated Capability Class = 1 −11.51∗∗∗ −6.963∗∗∗ −5.352∗∗∗ −4.800∗∗∗ −5.511∗∗∗
(0.989) (0.434) (1.127) (0.678) (0.662)
Saturated thickness of the aquifer (ft) 0.061∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003)
Quantity authorized for extraction
(af)
0.013∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.0130∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Field size (ac) 0.266∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003)
Center pivot irrigation system (com-
pared to flood)
48.08∗∗∗ 33.17∗∗∗ 23.54∗∗∗ 28.60∗∗∗ 19.16∗∗∗
(1.262) (0.603) (1.490) (0.962) (0.886)
Center pivot irrigation system with
dropped nozzles (compared to flood)
45.55∗∗∗ 34.47∗∗∗ 21.91∗∗∗ 29.96∗∗∗ 19.18∗∗∗
(1.114) (0.505) (1.191) (0.787) (0.703)
10 year forecast of the real acreage-
weighted price of commodities ($/bu)
0.781 −8.826∗∗∗ −1.948 −23.23∗∗∗ 1.797
(2.952) (1.508) (4.016) (2.485) (2.342)
Quantity of water used by neighbors
in 1 mile radius in t-1 (af)
0.006∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.003∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Inverse Mills Ratio −8.028∗∗∗ −1.374∗∗ 3.787∗∗∗ 22.91∗∗∗ 1.897∗∗∗
(0.466) (0.513) (0.769) (0.814) (0.501)
Constant 391.3∗∗∗ −159.5∗∗∗ −180.5∗∗∗ −9.437 −163.9∗∗∗
(41.92) (18.55) (51.90) (31.01) (31.69)
Observations 154,619 154,619 154,619 154,619 154,619
Notes: Standard errors appeaer in parentheses. For the energy price, we use the natural gas price as the energy price for farmers in counties with natural gas
production and the diesel price as the energy price for all other farmers. Significance is denoted as follows: ∗ = 5% level, ∗∗ = 1% level, and ∗∗∗ = 0.1% level.
million btu decreases water demand condi-
tional on crop choice by 5.145 acre-feet along
the intensive margin.
Table 7 summarizes the calculations used to
derive the total extensive margin. We consider
only the significant coefficients on the energy
price and on the interaction between energy
price and depth to groundwater in table 4, and
only the significant coefficients on acres allo-
cated to each crop and acres allocated to each
crop squared in table 5. We evaluate the effects
of crop acreage on water use at the mean acres
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Table 5. Results forWater Demand Conditional on Crop Choice (Intensive Margin)
Dependent variable is quantity of irrigation water pumped (acre-feet)
Energy price ($/million btu) −5.029∗∗∗
(0.292)
Energy price ($/million btu) squared 0.163∗∗∗
(0.014)
Energy price ($/million btu) ∗ Depth to groundwater (ft) −0.020∗∗∗
(0.001)
Depth to groundwater (ft) 0.290∗∗∗
(0.008)
Acres planted to alfalfa 0.483∗∗∗
(0.012)
Acres planted to alfalfa squared −0.00026∗∗∗
(0.00006)
Acres planted to corn 0.307∗∗∗
(0.006)
Acres planted to corn squared 0.00038∗∗∗
(0.00002)
Acres planted to sorghum −0.168∗∗∗
(0.017)
Acres planted to sorghum squared 0.00069∗∗∗
(0.00009)
Acres planted to soybeans 0.226∗∗∗
(0.015)
Acres planted to soybeans squared 0.00026∗∗
(0.00010)
Acres planted to wheat −0.104∗∗∗
(0.0114)
Acres planted to wheat squared 0.00035∗∗∗
(0.00006)
Recharge (in) −3.914∗∗∗
(0.425)
Average yearly precipitation, 1971–2000 (in) 1.271∗∗∗
(0.167)
Average evapotranspiration (in) 0.990∗∗
(0.373)
Slope (% of distance) 2.423∗∗∗
(0.282)
Irrigated Capability Class = 1 (Dummy) −12.04∗∗∗
(0.525)
Saturated thickness of the aquifer (ft) 0.159∗∗∗
(0.003)
Quantity authorized for extraction (af) 0.062∗∗∗
(0.001)
Field size (ac) 0.336∗∗∗
(0.003)
Center pivot irrigation system (compared to flood) −6.251∗∗∗
(0.713)
Center pivot irrigation system with dropped nozzles (compared to flood) −4.298∗∗∗
(0.584)
10 year forecast of the real acreage-weighted price of commodities ($/bu) −40.69∗∗∗
(1.038)
Left land fallow or planted with a non-irrigated plot (dummy) −134.8∗∗∗
(0.865)
Quantity of water used by neighbors in 1 mile radius in t-1 (af) 0.0194∗∗∗
(0.001)
Constant 85.01∗∗∗
(21.35)
Observations 154,619
R-squared 0.53
Notes: Standard errors appear in parentheses. For the energy price, we use the natural gas price as the energy price for farmers in counties with natural gas
production and the diesel price as the energy price for all other farmers. Significance is denotes as follows: ∗ = 5% level, ∗∗ = 1% level, and ∗∗∗ = 0.1% level.
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Table 6. Total Intensive Margin
Coefficient on energy price 5.029
Coeffficient on energy price squared 0.163
Coefficient on energy price ∗ depth to
groundwater
−0.020
Mean energy price ($/million btu) 7.33
Mean depth to groundwater (ft) 125.27
TOTAL INTENSIVEMARGIN
(
∂w
∂e
)
−5.145
Notes: Only significant coefficients are used in the calculation. The effect of
energy price on water use is evaluated at the mean energy price and the mean
depth to groundwater. Energy prices e are in $/million btu. Water use w is in
acre-feet. For the energy price, we use the natural gas price as the energy price
for farmers in counties with natural gas production, and the diesel price as the
energy price for all other farmers.
Table 7. Total Extensive Margin
∂w
∂nc∗
∂nc∗
∂e
∂w
∂nc∗
∂nc∗
∂e
Alfafa 0.477 0.033 0.016
Corn 0.352 −1.303 −0.459
Sorghum −0.161 −0.831 0.134
Soybeans 0.232 −2.213 −0.513
Wheat −0.092 −0.797 0.074
TOTAL EXTENSIVE MARGIN(∑
c
∂w
∂nc∗
∂nc∗
∂e
)
−0.749
Notes: Only significant coefficients are used in the calculation. The effects of
crop acreage on water use are evaluated at mean crop acreage. The effects of
energy price on crop acreage are evaluated at the mean depth to groundwater.
Energy prices e are in $/million btu. Water use w is in acre-feet. The number
of acres nc∗ planted to each crop c is in acres. For the energy price, we use the
natural gas price as the energy price for farmers in counties with natural gas
production and the diesel price as the energy price for all other farmers.
allocated to each crop, and evaluate the effects
of energy price on crop acreage at the mean
depth to groundwater. An increase in energy
prices by $1 per million btu decreases water use
by 0.749 acre-feet along the extensive margin.
We are mainly interested in the total
marginal effects of an increase in the energy
price, calculated using equation (4) and re-
ported in table 8. An increase in energy prices
would decrease water use along both the inten-
sive and extensive margins. Our estimated total
marginal effect of energy prices,which sums the
effects on the intensive and extensive margins,
is that an increase in the energy price of $1 per
million btu, which is approximately 13.6% of
its mean value over the time period of our data
set,would decrease water extraction by an indi-
vidual farmer by 5.89 acre-feet per year, which
is approximately 3.6% of the average amount
pumped in a year by a farmer. Our estimated
elasticity of water extraction with respect to
energy price is −0.26.
In table 8, we also report the total marginal
effects resulting from two alternative specifica-
tions for the energy price. In specificationA,we
use the natural gas price as the energy price for
farmers in counties with natural gas production
and the electricity price (instead of the diesel
price) as the energy price for all other farmers,
and find that an increase in the energy price
of $1 per million btu, which is approximately
8.9% of its mean value over the time period of
our data set, would decrease water extraction
by an individual farmer by 2.17 acre-feet per
year, which is approximately 1.3% of the aver-
age amount pumped in a year by a farmer. Our
estimated elasticity of water extraction with
respect to energy price under specification A
is −0.15.
In specification B, we use the natural gas
price as the energy price for all farmers,and find
that an increase in the energy price of $1 per
million btu, which is approximately 20.0% of
its mean value over the time period of our data
set,would decrease water extraction by an indi-
vidual farmer by 8.57 acre-feet per year, which
Table 8. Total Marginal Effects
Base case Alternative A Alternative B
Total intensive margin
(
∂w
∂e
)
−5.145 −2.002 −8.126
Total extensive margin
(∑
c
∂w
∂nc∗
∂nc∗
∂e
)
−0.749 −0.170 −0.439
TOTAL MARGINAL EFFECT
(
dw
de
= ∂w
∂e
+∑
c
∂w
∂nc∗
∂nc∗
∂e
)
−5.89 −2.17 −8.57
Notes: Only significant coefficients are used in the calculation. The effects of energy price on crop acreage and on water use are evaluated at the mean energy
price and the mean depth to groundwater. The effects of crop acreage on water use are evaluated at mean crop acreage. Energy prices e are in $/million btu.
Water use w is in acre-feet. The number of acres nc∗ planted to each crop c is in acres. Results are presented for three specifications of the energy price. In the
base case specification, we use the natural gas price as the energy price for farmers in counties with natural gas production and the diesel price as the energy price
for all other farmers. In specification A, we use the natural gas price as the energy price for farmers in counties with natural gas production and the electricity
price as the energy price for all other farmers. In specification B, we use the natural gas price as the energy price for all farmers.
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is approximately 5.2% of the average amount
pumped in a year by a farmer. Our estimated
elasticity of water extraction with respect to
energy price under specification B is −0.26.
The total marginal effect for the base case
specification of energy price is in between the
total marginal effect for specificationA and the
total marginal effect for specification B. The
estimated elasticities for all three specifications
are similar, and are equal to −0.26 for both the
base case and for specification B. Our results
on the effects of energy price therefore appear
robust to the energy price specification used.
Conclusion
In this article we examine the effects of
energy prices on groundwater extraction using
an econometric model of a farmer’s irriga-
tion water pumping decision that accounts for
both the intensive and extensive margins. Our
results show that energy prices have an effect
on both margins. Higher energy prices affect
crop selection decisions, crop acreage alloca-
tion decision, and farmers’ demand for water.
Higher energy prices decrease water use along
both the intensive and extensive margins.
Our estimated total marginal effect, which
sums the effects at the intensive and exten-
sive margins, shows that a $1 increase in the
energy price, which is approximately 13.6% of
its mean value over the time period of our data
set,would decrease water extraction by an indi-
vidual farmer by 5.89 acre-feet per year, which
is approximately 3.6% of the average amount
pumped in a year by a farmer. The estimated
elasticity of water extraction with respect to
energy price is −0.26.
Our results suggest that energy prices do
have an effect on groundwater extraction,
causing water use to decrease along both
the intensive and extensive margins. This
finding is particularly important in the face
of possible increases in energy prices in the
future, which may cause farmers to respond
by decreasing their water use. Our results
also suggest that policies that reduce energy
prices would cause groundwater extraction to
increase, therefore posing a potential concern
to conservationists who are worried about
declining water table levels in many of the
world’s most productive agricultural basins
that depend on groundwater.
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